The paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. Technology is carried across borders by multinational producers and the set of technologies being used in a particular country is endogenous. Production locations are chosen based on the costs of production and getting the product to market. The model incorporates vertical, horizontal, o¤shoring, and export-platform FDI. Estimated model parameters describe the states of technology in di¤erent countries, barriers to international investment, and trade costs. The model is used to quantify the welfare e¤ects of international production and trade and to investigate the e¤ects of free-trade agreements on o¤shoring. JEL codes: F11, F15, F17, F21, F23, O33
Introduction
International production is an important feature of the modern economy. It occurs when …rms set up production in one or more locations outside of their home countries. This international movement of producers coexists with the international movement of goods and services, with both having the potential to greatly improve world productivity and welfare.
One of the important bene…ts of international production is the di¤usion of technology. A …rm establishing production in a foreign country brings along its production technology, thus bene…tting the host country. While this bene…t is important to all countries, it is especially important to the developing countries that lack productive domestic technologies. This paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. In the model, producers may choose to locate production in their home countries or anywhere in the world and they may sell their output anywhere in the world. An important component of the model is the technology transfer associated with multinational production.
When deciding where to produce, producers shop for a location that gives them the lowest cost of production and getting their product to market. As the result of this choice, a producer may Assistant Professor of Economics, Su¤olk University and Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Boston University. Email: serge.shikher@su¤olk.edu.
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end up making its product in its home country, target market country, or a third country. The same producer may choose di¤erent production locations to serve di¤erent markets. 1 The model incorporates productivity di¤erences across producers. Productivity achieved in production is determined by the technology being used and the ability of a …rm to implement this technology. Technology is developed in the home country while the ability of the …rm to implement it depends on the location of production.
Technological di¤erences are probabilistic and described by a statistical distribution, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) . However, while their model has producers drawing productivity in the country where they are located, the model of this paper allows producers to draw productivity in their home country and then bring this technology to the country where they produce. Therefore, this paper extends the methodology of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to include foreign direct investment and the associated technology transfer. This extension endogenizes technology used in production.
The model yields expressions relating bilateral international trade and production to technology, factor costs, implementation factors, and trade costs. The model is parametrized using the average of the 1997-2003 data on bilateral trade and international production in manufactures for the following countries: Canada, Europe, Japan, United States, and the rest of the world (ROW). The estimated parameters include bilateral trade costs, measures of the states of technology and impediments to its implementation. The paper also measures the contribution of international production to technology di¤usion.
The model is used to perform several counterfactual simulations that address questions interesting to economists and policy-makers. The …rst set of simulations quanti…es the welfare e¤ects of the current levels of the international production and trade in manufactures. It is found that all countries bene…t from trade and international production. The magnitude of the gains from trade are similar to those found in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and is greater than the magnitude of the gains from international production.
The second set of simulations quanti…es the welfare e¤ects of moving to a world in which international trade is free and producers can establish foreign operations just as easily as they can establish the domestic ones, a scenario called free international production in this paper. The welfare e¤ects of such a move are found to be much greater than the welfare e¤ects of the current levels of international production and trade. For countries that currently have productive domestic technologies, moving to free trade or free international production brings similar welfare gains. The ROW, however, which is dominated by developing countries, bene…ts much more from international production than trade.
The last simulation looks at the e¤ect of a free-trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW on o¤shoring by the U.S. producers. The politically sensitive topic of o¤shoring often comes up in discussions of free trade agreements with developing countries. While o¤shoring currently constitutes a relatively small fraction of the total output of the U.S. …rms, there is a fear that it may grow signi…cantly as the result of free-trade agreements with developing countries, which have much lower wages.
The model is able to provide a quantitative forecast of a maximum possible change in o¤shoring in response to a free trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW, where the wage is about ten times lower than in the U.S. It is found that there is a substantial increase in the o¤shoring activity by the U.S. producers, but the absolute magnitude of o¤shoring remains small as a fraction of the total U.S. output or spending. The signi…cant impediments encountered by the U.S. …rms attempting to set up production in the ROW prevent a greater increase in o¤shoring.
There are few existing models that combine international production and trade, because of various technical challenges inherent in creating such a model. Markusen, Venables, Konan and Zhang (1996) , Yeaple (2003) , Helpman (2006) , Keller and Yeaple (2008) create two-or threecountry models of various modes of FDI and trade. By comparison, the model of this paper is able to parsimoniously describe a multi-country world where producers engage in various modes of FDI and trade. Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) create a multi-country model of multinational production and trade that can be viewed as an alternative to the model of this paper.
There is a number of models that consider each mode of international production in isolation. These models can be classi…ed into two categories: those that consider producer heterogeneity in productivity and those that do not.
There are models of vertical FDI where …rms search for low factor costs. Helpman (1984 Helpman ( , 1985 ) develops such a model without producer heterogeneity. Garetto (2008) , and Yeaple (2009) are two recent papers that incorporate producer heterogeneity. There are several models of the exportplatform FDI, all without producer heterogeneity (Hanson, 2001; Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen, 2005) .
There are models of horizontal FDI, where …rms replicate the same activity in many locations. The models without producer heterogeneity include Markusen (1984) and Venables (1998, 2000) . The models with producer heterogeneity include Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Ramondo (2008) .
There is also a model of FDI called the knowledge-capital (KK) model (Markusen, 1997; Markusen, 2002) . The central feature of this model is that technology developed at the headquarters of a …rm is copied to a¢ liates in many countries. This feature also exists in the model of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts regarding FDI. Section 3 explains the model. Sections 4 describes the data. Section 5 explains the parameter estimation procedure and presents the parameter estimates. Section 7 performs several counterfactual simulations using the model. Section 8 concludes.
Terminology and stylized facts of international production
While the stylized facts about international trade are fairly widely known, the facts about international production are not. Therefore, it may be useful to review them here in order to motivate the model that follows.
International production (IP) is the result of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is an investment in another country with the ability to exert managerial control over the production process. 2 For practical purposes, international agencies equate managerial control to a 10% stake in the enterprise. The FDI is done by multinational corporations (MNCs) that have headquarters in a home country and operations in one or more other countries. The foreign operations of MNCs are called foreign a¢ liates. If they are majority-owned (stake greater than 50%) then they are called majority-owned foreign a¢ liates (MOFAs).
Producers have several reasons to move production outside their home countries. First, it allows them to circumvent trade costs when serving foreign markets. Producers will be more likely to produce in a foreign country that is distant or has high import barriers. International production (IP) that occurs in order to achieve proximity of production to market is typically called "horizontal" IP. The foreign direct investment (FDI) that is required to establish international production in this case is called "horizontal" FDI. This form of FDI is an alternative to trade.
Second, moving production to other countries allows producers to take advantage of cheaper inputs. It is often cheaper labor, but can also be other inputs, such as intermediate goods. International production that occurs when producers shop around for cheapest production costs is typically called "vertical" IP and the required FDI the "vertical" FDI. A special case of vertical IP occurs when a …rm produces in a foreign country and sells goods back to its home country, a phenomenon called o¤shoring. Firms can also move production to a foreign country in order to serve a third country, a scenario called the export-platform IP.
The size of international production can be measured in several ways. It can be measured by the cumulative investment made by the MNCs into their a¢ liates. This measure is called the stock of FDI and is calculated from the annual FDI ‡ows reported in national accounts. The size of IP can also be measured by the output, sales, employment, or reported assets of the a¢ liates.
There are advantage and disadvantage to using each of these measures. FDI ‡ows are available for a wide range of countries and years, but are volatile and may be inaccurate because investments are often routed through the third countries. Industry distribution of FDI may be inaccurate for a similar reason: investments are often routed through holding companies in other industries. In addition, the FDI stocks reported by statistical agencies do not take into account changes in asset and currency values.
The data on a¢ liates'output, sales, employment, and assets is collected by industrial surveys and re ‡ects ownership and industry more accurately than FDI ‡ows. However, this data is available for only a few countries and years. The collection and reporting methodologies of this data are sometimes inconsistent across countries.
Despite all the problems with the international production data noted above, the quantity and quality of the IP data is improving and we now have a reasonably good picture of international production. We know that most of it occurs in developed countries: 70% of the world FDI in ‡ows is received by industrial countries and 70% of the U.S. MOFAs (by output) are in the G7 countries. 3 The level of parental control of foreign a¢ liates is high: most (85% for the U.S.) are majorityowned. Most of the R&D is done in the home country: only 13% of the U.S. MNC's R&D is performed by their MOFAs.
Most of the foreign a¢ liates'output is sold locally (66% for the U.S. MOFAs). The rest is sold to the home country and third countries (11% and 23% for the U.S. MOFAs). However, there is signi…cant heterogeneity in these numbers across host countries. For example, the percentage of the U.S. MOFA's output sold locally varies between 22% in Bermuda and 95% in India. Figure D1 shows how this number varies across countries. The percentage of the U.S. MOFAs'output sold to the U.S. varies between 0.2% in Greece and 46% in Barbados. The U.S. MOFAs'sales to the third countries vary between 2% of output in India and 70% in Luxemburg. Sales to home are the result of o¤shoring. Sales to the third countries are the result of the export-platform IP. O¤shoring and export-platform IP are usually considered to be the types of vertical IP. The size of the local sales, on the other hand, is often used to measure the magnitude of the horizontal IP.
It is interesting to compare two di¤erent ways that a company can serve a foreign market: trade and local production. To make this comparison, we look at the ratio of the U.S. merchandise exports to the local sales of the U.S. MOFAs. The most striking feature of this data is how much it varies across countries. Some countries, such as Bermuda (0.08), Poland (0.11), and the U.K. (0.15), are served mostly by multinational production. Other countries, such as Israel (5.5), Costa Rica (2.65), and Korea (2.24), are served mostly through exports. Figure D2 shows the variation of the ratio across countries. 5 The task of the model in the following section is to explain the multitude of strategies and behaviors of producers.
Model of international production and trade
There are N countries. In every country there is a continuum of producers, each making a single good indexed by a real number j 2 [0; 1]. Consumers have CES preferences over the goods. Every product has a blueprint for making it, a result of the R&D e¤ort. Looking at the blueprint, engineers can predict its productivity. This predicted productivity will be called the blueprint productivity and denoted by z(j) 2 (0; 1).
The R&D process is probabilistic and producers draw their blueprint productivities from a statistical distribution. Every country has its own blueprint for making j, so the blueprint productivity of good j in country h is denoted by z h (j). This productivity is the realization of a random variable Z h which has a country-speci…c distribution with cdf F z h . 6 A producer draws its blueprint productivity in its home country, but can manufacture its product anywhere in the world using its blueprint. The same producer may establish production facilities in many countries. Each of these a¢ liates can then sell its product in many countries around the world. Table 1 lists various options for a producer to organize its operations.
Throughout the paper, the home country of a producer will be denoted by h, the county of production by i, and the country of sale by n.
In order to start production in country i, a producer needs to implement its blueprint there. For various reasons, the productivity achieved in the production of good j may be di¤erent from its stated blueprint productivity z h (j). This di¤erence, called the implementation factor, is a¤ected by the location of production and denoted by ih (j). The productivity achieved in production is
While z h (j) is the productivity predicted by engineers from the blueprint of j, the productivity of the actual production process may end up being higher or lower. Therefore, the implementation factor ih (j) is allowed to vary between 0 and 1. If 0 < ih (j) < 1, the actual productivity is lower than what is projected by the blueprint. If 1 < ih (j) < 1, the actual productivity is higher than projected. 8 The implementation factor varies across goods, which means that blueprints from country h for di¤erent goods j will be implemented in country i with di¤erent degrees of success. We can say that while the blueprint productivity depends on the strength of the R&D department, the implementation factor depends on the strength of the local management team of a producer.
The implementation process is probabilistic and the implementation factors are drawn from a distribution with cdf F ih which is speci…c to each country pair fi; hg. A higher mean of this distribution makes country i more attractive to producers from country h. Implementation factors are independent across countries i and h, and across goods j.
A producer from h that manufactures good j in country i and sells it in country n pays the production cost c i , transportation cost d ni , and sees its blueprint productivity change by ih (j). Therefore, its total cost of this enterprise is v nih (j) = c i d ni = ih (j). This cost can be thought of as a cost of getting a blueprint to market. Note that v nih (j) is inversely proportional to the implementation factor ih (j), so that a higher ih (j) leads to a lower total cost of getting a blueprint to market. Since ih is a random variable, v nih is also a random variable with cdf F v nih . The production cost c i consists of the payments for factors and intermediate goods. Assuming that capital and labor are the only factors, and that production function is Cobb-Douglas, the production cost is
where is the share of capital in output, is the share of labor, and p i is the price of the intermediate goods bundle.
Transportation cost has the "iceberg" form. To receive $1 of product in country n, a producer has to send d ni > 1 dollars of product from country i. Domestic trade cost is set to one: d nn 1.
Since the goods market has perfect competition, producers set prices equal to their costs. A producer of j from h manufacturing in i and selling in n sets the price p nih (j) = v nih (j)=z h (j). This producer is successful in n only if it is the lowest-price supplier of j there. Therefore, it chooses a production location i in order to minimize the cost of getting its blueprint of good j to country n. The minimum such cost will be denoted by v nh (j) = min i fv nih (j)g. The price in country n of product j made by an h producer will then be p nh (j) = v nh (j)=z h (j). 9 7 This speci…cation is equivalent to using "iceberg" costs for international investment, an approach that has been previously used by the empirical literature on FDI as well as the more recent models of FDI with heterogeneous producers. 8 The unbounded supports of the distributions of z(j) and (j) mean that the model cannot replicate zero trade or investment ‡ows between countries. Ramondo (2008) and Chor (2009) develop models where zero trade or FDI ‡ows are made possible by bounding the support of the technology distributions. While allowing unbounded supports limits the applicability of the model to large countries or country blocks, it also reduces the complexity of the model and makes it more tractable.
9 Why cannot ih be the same for all goods j, same as trade cost dni? If ih were the same for all goods j, then for a given pair of countries fn; hg there would have been only one (for all goods j) production location i that gives the minimum cost to market. An implication is that for a given pair of countries, there could only be trade or IP
The timing of the model is as follows: each producer draws its blueprint productivity z h (j) in its home country h, then draws adjustment factors ih (j) for all possible production locations i. Knowing these values, each producer decides whether to produce and where to produce.
Since the cost to market v nih (j) is independent across manufacturing locations i, the minimum cost to market V nh is a random variable distributed with cdf
Country h presents country n with the distribution of prices p nh , which has cdf F p nh . Consumers in n buy from the lowest-price supplier of j, so the price of j there is p n (j) = min h fp nh (j)g. Since the minimum cost to market v nh (j) is independent across h, the distribution of prices in country n is
The CES price index in country n is
1= (1 ) . (4) It is assumed that the intermediate goods bundle consists of all goods combined in the CES fashion. Therefore, p n is also the price of the intermediate goods bundle in (1). The probability that a producer from h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j is nih Pr (A nih ) = Pr (B nh \ C nih ) = Pr (B nh ) Pr (C nih ), where event A nih is "a producer from h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j, event B nh is "a producer from h is the lowest-price supplier of j in n, and event C nih is "country i provides the lowest cost to market n for a producer of j from h. The last equality holds because events B nh and C nih are independent.
Addressing each of these two events individually, we have
The second equality holds because v nih are independent across i. The probability of the event B nh is
Thus, the probability that a producer from h would locate its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j is
Since there is a continuum [0; 1] of producers, nih is also the fraction of goods that n buys from the i-located h producers. It means that P h P i nih = 1. Note that the two integrals in equation (7) are guaranteed to converge because F p ns and F v nsh are cdf's of random variables.
(FDI), but not both. In fact, for some country pairs, there could be no trade or investment (all production would take place in a third country). When ih is random, di¤erent producers from h may choose di¤erent ways of serving market n.
Trade and foreign direct investment
Since nih is the fraction of goods that n buys from the i-located h producers, then X nih = nih X n , where X n is the total spending in n, is equal to the sales in n of the i-located h producers. The total spending in n on the goods manufactured in i, i.e. the volume of imports from i to n, is
where
is the probability that a producer located in i (of any origin h) is the least-price supplier in n. 10 Note that the de…nition of ni means that P s ns = 1. 11 Total sales of the a¢ liates of h located in i are
Note that for given i and h, events A nih are not mutually exclusive across n's. Some a¢ liates sell to just one country while others sell to many countries. So, the probabilities nih cannot be added up across n, but the dollar amounts can. 12 The stock of foreign direct investment is derived from the sales of foreign a¢ liates S ih . Let ih be the fraction of capital stock in i that is owned by the producers from h. Then, the stock of foreign direct investment in i owned by the h producers is ih K i . Let ih be the fraction of the labor force in i employed by the producers from h. These de…nitions of ih and ih mean that P s is = P s is = 1. Then, note that the distribution of the production e¢ ciencies ih z h of the producers that are actually producing in i is the same regardless of their origin h. In other word, conditioning on the origin h does not a¤ect the distribution of ih z h . A country h with a higher state of technology and lower barriers to investment in i will increase the number of a¢ liates in i until the distribution of their e¢ ciencies is the same as that of the a¢ liates from the other countries (and that of i's domestic producers).
The above means that the average (across producers) capital-output ratio (and also the laboroutput ratio) is the same for any origin h. This allows us to relate ih and ih to the sales of foreign a¢ liates:
Therefore, both ih and ih measure the ownership structure of a country's producers.
1 0 Note that for given n and i, events A nih across di¤erent h's are mutually exclusive. In other words, two producers from any two locations h1 and h2 cannot establish manufacturing facilities in the same location i in order to supply the same product j to the same market n. Therefore nih are additive across origins h. Also, for given n and h events A nih across di¤erent i's are mutually exclusive, since a producer from h would not establish a¢ liates in more than one location i in order to supply the same market n. Therefore nih is additive across production locations i. 1 1 It is also possible to derive the volume of sales of h producers (manufacturing anywhere in the world) in n. Let nh = P s nsh be the probability that a producer from h (manufacturing anywhere in the world) sells in n. Therefore, nh Xn is the volume of sales of h …rms in n. The expression for nh simpli…es considerably. The second term in the expression for nih disappears, and the probability that a producer from h (manufacturing anywhere) is the least-price supplier in n is simply nh Pr (p nh (j) 6 mins fpns(j); s 6 = hg).
1 2 So P n nih is not a probability that a …rm located in i has come from h (or a fraction of …rms located in i that has come from h), because some a¢ liates may sell to more than one destination.
Equation (8) is a gravity-like equation for international trade because it relates trade to country characteristics and trade costs. Equation (11) is a gravity-like equation for FDI because it relates FDI to country characteristics and the implementation factors, which can be interpreted as barriers to investment.
Market clearing
Due to data limitations, only the manufacturing industries are modeled. Model closure follows the usual practice. In each country i, output must equal spending:
Manufacturing goods can be used as either …nal or intermediate goods. Therefore, X n = Z n + C n , where Z n is the spending on the intermediate manufacturing goods and C n is the spending on the …nal manufacturing goods. The latter is assumed to be a …xed portion of a country's income:
The former is given by the production function: Z n = (1 ) Q n . Putting these expressions together we obtain the equation for total spending:
Country income is the sum of capital income and labor income in manufacturing, and nonmanufacturing income. It is assumed that the pro…ts are not repatriated to the headquarters. This assumption is made for two reasons: (a) to make the technology transfer the only transfer associated with FDI, so the focus stays on it and (b) to make the model more similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002) where income stays in the country of production.
The total income in n is
where Y o n is the nonmanufacturing income. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002) , the nonmanufacturing income is considered …xed.
Factor stocks K n and L n are speci…c to manufacturing. Capital and labor are not mobile between the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Factor employments are given by
Imposing distributional forms
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) , it is assumed that the productivity draws z h (j) > 0 have the Fréchet distribution with the shaping parameter and location parameter h . The cdf of z h is therefore F z h (z) = e h z , where is common across countries while h is di¤erent. 13 Parameter h measures the state of the domestically-sourced technology in each country. It is assumed that implementation factors ih (j) > 0 are also distributed Fréchet. 14 The cdf of ih is F ih ( ) = e ih , where the shaping parameter is the same across country pairs while the location parameter ih is di¤erent.
If ih is distributed Fréchet, then v nih = c i d ni = ih has the Weibull distribution with cdf F v nih = 1 e ~ nih v , where~ nih = ih (c i d ni ) . The probability that country i provides a producer from h with the lowest cost to market n (event C nih ) is
where nh = P s~ nsh . The least cost-to-market v nh is distributed with cdf F v nh = 1
The price p nh (j) = v nh (j)=z h (j) is the product of two independent (not necessarily identically distributed) Weibull random variables (v nh andz h = 1=z h , since the inverse of a Fréchet r.v. is a Weibull r.v.). This product is itself a random variable with cdf F p nh (p) = R p; ; ; nh ; h and pdf f p nh (p) = r p; ; ; nh ; h , where functions R ( ) and r ( ) will be de…ned below. The distribution of this random variable is derived by Sagias, Karagiannidis, Mathiopoulos and Tsiftsis (2006), Sagias and Tombras (2007) , and Bithas, Sagias, Tsiftsis and Karagiannidis (2007) . 15 To make the numerical analysis workable, it is assumed that the shaping parameters of the distributions of v nih andz h are the same. When = the cdf and pdf of p nh are
and
where K q ( ) is the qth order modi…ed Bessel function of the second kind. The probability that an h producer located in i is the lowest-price supplier of j in n (event B nh ) is
Therefore, the probability that a producer from h would establish production in i in order to supply n is given by the following integral equation:
r p; ; ; nh ; h dp.
Plugging in the expressions for the cdf and pdf of p, this equation becomes
that can be evaluated numerically. The integral converges, as explained below equation (7). Prices in each country are distributed with cdf
which has the corresponding pdf
(23) derived in the technical appendix (available upon request). The CES prices index in country n is given by equation (4).
A¢ liate strategies
Section 2 described various strategies employed by producers in their quest to …nd the most coste¢ cient ways to serve various markets. These strategies, summarized in Table 1 , include exporting, o¤shoring, horizontal IP, and export-platform IP. How do various parameters of the model a¤ect the incentives of producers to choose one strategy over another?
When deciding how to serve a particular market n, a producer considers the cost of implementing its blueprint, cost of production, and cost of delivering the manufactured good to market. A producer will be a domestic exporter if the domestic implementation factor is high, domestic production cost is low, and the trade cost to market n is low. On the other hand, if the trade cost to market n is high, the implementation factor in n is high (which is more likely if nh is high), and the cost of production in n is low then the best strategy will be to set up a foreign a¢ liate in n and sell output locally, i.e. engage in horizontal IP.
It may be possible, though, that the trade cost from the home country to n is high, but the implementation factor in n is low or the cost of production there is high. In that case a producer will look for a country close to n with a high implementation factor and low production cost in order to establish production there and export output to n. This a¢ liate will then be engaged in export-platform IP.
Everything else equal, low trade costs d ni will encourage imports into n, while high trade costs will encourage horizontal IP there ("tari¤ jumping"). High implementation factors in n (high nh ) and low production costs c n will encourage producers to set up manufacturing in n. Low costs of shipping goods from n to other countries will encourage producers to use n as the platform for the export-oriented IP. Low costs of shipping goods from n to the producers'home countries will encourage o¤shoring.
How do producer characteristics relate to the producer's mode of operation (one of those listed in Table 1 )? For example, which producers will engage in trade and IP and which will only sell on the domestic market? Both trade and IP involve additional costs compared to domestic production and sales. Therefore, more productive producers are more likely to be competitive in foreign markets. So, more productive producers are more likely to engage in trade and/or IP. Also, more productive producers will serve more markets than less productive ones. 16 These properties of the model match the observed producer facts. 17 Of those producers that do serve foreign countries, which will engage in horizontal IP and which will be exporters? For a producer from h the decision whether to export to i or establish an a¢ liate there comes down to which option will give a lower price of its good in i. If a producer were to export to i, the price for its good in i would be p export ihh
. 18 If this producer were to set up an a¢ liate in i, the price for its good would be p IP iih (j) = c i = ih (j)z h (j). The ratio of these prices is p export ihh
If this ratio is greater than one, then local production is a better option. If it is less than one, then trade is better. The ratio depends on the cost of production in h relative to i, implementation factor in i relative to h, and the cost of bringing a good from h to i. Can we say something about the productivity of the producers that choose to export vs. those that choose IP? We can if we make an assumption that exporting is cheaper than IP for most producers and most destinations (Section 5.1 shows that this assumption holds for the countries in this paper's dataset). In this case, a producer is more likely to engage in exports than IP (and more producers engage in exports than IP). This means that a producer serving more destinations is more likely to serve some of them through IP than a producer serving fewer destinations. 19 Since more productive producers serve more destinations, they are more likely to engage in IP than less productive producers. This matches the observed fact that producers that engage in IP are, on average, more productive than those that only export. 20 It is also interesting to consider the choice between domestic production and o¤shoring. If a producer from h wanting to supply its good to its home market were to manufacture the good domestically, its price would be p dom hhh (j) = c h = hh (j)z h (j). If instead the manufacturing took place at an o¤shore a¢ liate in i, the price (in country h) would be p offshore hih
Because some markets n are more expensive to serve than others, more productive producers will be competitive in more markets than less productive producers.
1 7 There is a large literature that looks at producer-level heterogeneity in trade. This literature …nds that exporters are a minority and more productive than non-exporters. More productive exporters sell to more destinations than less productive exporters (Aw, Chung and Roberts, 1998; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 2004) .
1 8 The superscript "export" is not necessary, but is added for convenience. 1 9 Similarly, of the …rms that serve a speci…c number of destinations, the fraction of pure exporters (not engaged in IP) declines as the number of destinations rises.
2 0 There are several studies of producer heterogeneity in international production. They …nd that only a small fraction of …rms engage in FDI and that these …rms are more productive than the exporting …rms (Helpman et al., 2004; Tomiura, 2007) . ratio of these prices is
If this ratio is greater than one, then o¤shoring is a better option. Otherwise, domestic production is better. Similarly to (24), this ratio depends on cost of production in h relative to i and the implementation factor in i relative to h. However, the trade cost is now in the denominator rather than numerator. Therefore, it will always be the case that p export ihh
(j). A producer that prefers o¤shoring to domestic production will also prefer local production (horizontal IP) to exporting. A producer that is actually engaged in o¤shoring (being a least-price supplier of j in h) will also engage in local production and sales of j in i. Section 5.1 continues this analysis in view of the estimated parameter values.
Data
The dataset includes 5 "countries": Canada, Europe (which includes France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and UK), Japan, United States, and the rest of the world (denoted by ROW and dominated by China). Because of the availability of data, only the manufacturing sector is considered. The following data was collected: output, value added, total exports, total imports, employment, labor compensation, and bilateral trade from the World Bank's Trade and Production database, total country GDP from the World Bank's WDI database, and employment by foreign a¢ liates from the OECD's Globalization database (see Section 2 for a discussion on various measures of activity of foreign a¢ liates). Data is typically the average of several (2-3) years around 2000. Table D1 shows the country-level data. Note that the ROW's manufacturing output is similar to that of the U.S. and Europe, but its employment is an order of magnitude higher and its wage is an order of magnitude lower. Table D2 shows domestic and international trade, ni . Domestic trade (domestic spending on domestic goods, shown on the diagonal of the table) is much larger than international trade (shown on the o¤-diagonal entries). Note that each row adds up to the total spending of the importer and each column to the total output of the exporter. Table D3 shows the same data, but as a fraction of the total spending of the importer (so each row adds up to one), ni . The fraction of the domestic goods in total spending varies between 0.47 in Canada and 0.89 in Japan. Tables D4 also shows the same trade data, but as a fraction of the total output of the exporter. It clearly shows the signi…cance of the U.S. market for Canadian …rms: they sell 47% of their output on the domestic market and 45% on the U.S. market. Tables  3 and 4 show that Japan is the most closed economy of the …ve. The weight of its domestic trade in its total spending or output is greater than for any other country. We can also see that Canada is the most open economy of the …ve. Table D5 shows the employment in each of the …ve countries classi…ed by the country of ownership of the enterprise. This employment data shows the extent of the domestic and international production activities of the …rms. Domestic production (measured by the number of workers employed by domestic …rms, shown on the diagonal of the table) is much larger than international production (measured by the number of workers employed by foreign …rms, shown on the o¤-diagonal entries). The sum of each row is the total employment in each country. The sum of each column is the total employment at all the …rms from that country. Table D6 shows the same data, but as a fraction of the total employment in each country (so that each row adds up to one). This is the ownership structure of each country's producers, previously de…ned as ih . It shows that domestic …rms employ between 71% (in Canada) and 98% (in Japan) of the labor force. There is a substantial presence of the U.S. …rms in Canada: they employ 21% of the Canadian workers. The U.S. …rms employ about 6% of all workers in Europe and European …rms employ about 6% of all U.S. workers.
Very few Japanese workers are employed by foreign …rms. For example, the U.S. …rms employ only 0.8% of the Japanese workers. While a good number of workers are employed by foreign …rms in the rest of the world, their number is small relative to the total workforce there. European …rms employ 3% of the ROW's workforce, while the U.S. …rms employ 2%. Table D7 also shows the employment data, but this time as a fraction of the total employment by each country's …rms (so that each column adds up to one). The table shows that for all the countries except the ROW, a signi…cant part of the economic activity of their …rms takes place outside the national borders. For example, only 77% of workers employed by the U.S. …rms are American. The table also shows that the ROW's workers constitute a signi…cant percentage of the workforce of each country's …rms. For example, 14% of the workers employed by the U.S. …rms are located in the ROW.
Parameter estimation
We begin by identifying parameters ih , d ni , and h . It was previously assumed that domestic trade is free, i.e. d nn 1. It is also assumed that hh 1. Therefore, there are N (N 1) parameters d ni , N (N 1) parameters ih , and N parameters h that need to be identi…ed. The total number of these parameters is 2N 2 N .
The parameters are identi…ed by …tting equations (8) and (11) to data:
with nih given by (21):
and the following variables as de…ned earlier:~ nih = ih r i w i p 1 i d ni and nh = P s~ nsh . Note that the market clearing conditions Q i = P N n=1 ni X n are implied by equations (27). 21 Equations (26) and (27) number 2N 2 N . Spending X n , output Q n , trade ni , ownership structure ih , and wages w n are taken from data. Capital share is set to 0.105, labor share to 2 1 This can be see by taking the sum of (27) over h and remembering that ni = P h nih , and
0.195, and (gross) rates of return r n to 20% in every country. 22 The value of elasticity used to calculate the CES price index is set to 5. 23 The value of the shaping parameter is set to 8. This is the value estimated in Eaton and Kortum (2002) using price data. Changing the value of a¤ects the estimated parameter values in the manner similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002) . Setting a lower increases estimated trade costs d ni and decreases estimated parameters of the implementation factors'distributions ih (so lower results in higher estimated trade and IP costs). 24;25 The next section presents the estimated values of h , ih , and d ni for = 8.
Results
Since there are 5 countries, there are 2N 2 N = 45 parameters to be identi…ed from the same number of equations. Table B1 shows each country's estimated mean blueprint productivity, normalized with respect to the U.S. This mean productivity is calculated as ( h = U S ) 1= . We can see that Japan has a slightly higher state of technology than the U.S., while Europe and Canada have lower states. The ROW has a much lower state of technology than the other countries. Table B2 shows the estimated mean implementation factors, calculated as
1=
ih . The table shows owner countries in columns and host countries in rows. For example, the mean implementation factor for the U.S. …rms operating in Canada is 0.74.
All mean international implementation factors are smaller than one, i.e. smaller than the mean domestic implementation factors. This indicates that producers are, on average, more e¢ cient when they manufacture goods at home than abroad. Of course, cheaper costs of production and trade can still entice producers to move their operations abroad even when the implementation factors are less than one.
The producers from Canada, Europe, and the U.S. operating in the ROW have very small (0.3-0.4) mean implementation factors. Since the ROW is dominated by developing countries, especially China, producers operating there have to deal with poor infrastructure, unfriendly governments, etc., which make the implementation factors there very low. On the other hand, producers from the ROW operating in the other countries have implementation factors that are quite high. While they have to deal with all the usual issues of establishing production abroad, they often face more favorable business conditions in the foreign countries than at home.
Besides the ROW producers, high implementation factors are enjoyed by the U.S. …rms operating in Canada, and by European and Canadian …rms operating in the U.S. The high implementation factors between the U.S. and Canada are not surprising since NAFTA contains many provisions designed to facilitate FDI. Comparing host countries, we can see that the highest implementation factors are in the United States, which means that it provides a good environment for foreign producers.
Producers trying to establish production in Japan and Japanese producers trying to establish production abroad face low implementation factors. Much has been written about the di¢ culties encountered by the non-Japanese …rms trying to operate in Japan, so their low implementation factors are not surprising. The low implementation factors of the Japanese producers operating abroad are less expected. Perhaps they can be explained by management style di¤erences or some other business culture-related factors.
Looking at the technology parameters and implementation factors, we can ask the following question: can the average producer from a country drawing the average implementation factor in a foreign country be competitive with the average producer of the host country? Both producers face the same production and transportation costs. The only di¤erence is the productivity with which they operate.
For each country pair, Table B3 shows the production productivity of the average producer from country h (shown in columns) operating in country i (shown in rows), drawing the corresponding average implementation factor. This production productivity is equal to ( ih h = U S )
1= . For example the average producer from Europe operating in Canada would draw the blueprint productivity of 0:95 and the implementation factor of 0:62 resulting in the productivity of 0:95 0:62 0:58. The diagonal entries show the productivities of the average domestic producers (since the average domestic implementation factors are one). Table B3 shows that the production productivities are such that in every country the average domestic producer has an advantage over the average foreign producers drawing the average implementation factors. This implies that to be successful in a foreign country, a producer must either have a blueprint productivity that is better than his home country's average or draw an implementation factor that is better than average. The former can be achieved by having a better than average R&D department and the latter by having better than average managers. Table B4 shows the estimated trade costs. The average trade cost across all 20 country pairs is 1.65 (the tari¤ equivalent of this cost is 65%). This is similar to a typical international trade cost roughly estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) to be 0.74%. The lowest trade costs are between the U.S. and Canada (17% and 35% tari¤ equivalents) and between Europe and the ROW (24% and 33%). The highest trade costs are faced by the Japanese producers selling to Europe and Canada (114% and 122%).
The rest of the model parameters: country labor and capital endowments L i and K i , share of manufacturing in country spending ' i , and nonmanufacturing income Y o i , are easy to calculate. Because of the assumption of equal labor shares across countries, the labor stocks L n are calculated as L n = Q n =w n instead of being taken from data. These calculated labor stocks, shown in Table  B5 are very similar to the ones in the data with the correlation being 0.998. The capital stocks are calculated as K n = Q n =r n .
Preference parameters ' n are calculated as ' n = C n =Y n , where C n is the spending on …nal goods and Y n is the GDP. Spending on …nal goods is calculated as total spending minus spending on intermediate goods: C n = X n (1 ) Q n , while GDP is taken from data. The nonman-ufacturing income is calculated as Y o n = Y n w n L n r n K n . Table B5 presents the values of the preference parameters ' n . It shows that manufacturing makes up about 10 to 15% of each country's spending.
Relationships between trade costs, implementation factors, and technology parameters
What are the relationships between the values of these key parameters? The trade costs d ni and mean implementation factors 1= ni are negatively correlated ( = 0:58). 26 They are plotted together on Figure B1 . Since low implementation factors are a barrier to international production while high trade costs are a barrier to international trade, this result means that these two kinds of international barriers go hand-in-hand. The relatively high correlation between the two means that one can serve as a fairly accurate predictor of the other. 27 A possible explanation for the high correlation between trade and investment barriers is that some of the factors that a¤ect one also a¤ect the other. For example, common language, physical proximity, free-trade agreements, and institutions are known to a¤ect trade costs and likely also a¤ect implementation factors. Government policy toward imports may be a subset of a more general policy toward openness that a¤ects not only trade, but also foreign investment.
There is little or no correlation between the implementation factors and technology parameters of the owner and host countries. This means that high-technology countries do not o¤er better implementation factors as hosts or face lower implementation factors as investors than the lowtechnology countries.
A¢ liate strategies revisited
Section 3.4 discussed the choice of producers between exporting to a destination vs. setting up production there. It was said that if exporting is cheaper than setting up production for most producers and most destination, then more producers will engage in exports than IP and those producers that engage in IP will, on average, be more productive than exporters. We can now check if exporting is indeed cheaper than IP for most producers and most destinations in the dataset.
We will calculate the price that a producer from h expects to receive if it exports its goods to i relative to the price that it expects to receive if it sets up production in i:
This ratio depends on the relative cost of production in h and i, average implementation factor faced by an h producer in i, and the cost of bringing goods from h to i. The relative costs of production for each pair of countries are shown in Table B6 , where i is a row and h is a column. It shows that for Canada, Europe, Japan, and the U.S. the relative costs of production are within 15% of each other. On the other hand, the costs of production in those countries are, on average, 50% greater than in ROW. Average implementation factors were shown in Table B2 and trade costs in Table B4 . We can see in Table B2 that the low cost of production in the ROW is o¤set by the low implementation factors there. 28 Table B7 shows the ratio of the expected prices E h p export ihh =p IP iih i . Out of the 20 country pairs only 3 have this ratio greater than one. For those pairs of countries, IP gives a lower expected price than exporting. For example, the U.S. producers targeting the European market and the European producers targeting the U.S. market will, on average, …nd that setting up production in the target market gives them a lower price than exporting. The same is true for the Canadian producers targeting the European market. For the vast majority (17 out of 20) of country pairs, exporting to a destination will, on average, give a lower price than setting up production in the target market. Therefore, the assumption made in Section 3.4 that exporting is cheaper than setting up local production for most producers and most destination holds for the countries in the dataset.
Section 3.4 also discussed the choice between domestic production and o¤shoring. We can now calculate the price that a producer from h expects to receive if it produces a good domestically relative to the price that it expects to receive if it produces the good o¤shore: Table B8 shows this ratio for all country pairs. All the relative expected prices are signi…cantly less than one, meaning that domestic production is on average much cheaper than o¤shoring for all countries. The best chance that o¤shoring may produce a lower price exists between the U.S. and Canada where NAFTA helps to make implementation factors high and trade costs low. Since the relative expected prices are less then one, producers will only engage in o¤shoring if their foreign implementation factor draw relative to their home implementation factor draw, ih (j)= hh (j), is better (greater) than average.
Model vs. data
Section 2 presented the stylized facts on international production. One of the facts mentioned in that section is that the percentage of output of the U.S. foreign a¢ liates that is sold locally varies from country to country. This percentage for various countries around the world is shown on Figure  D1 . We can now examine what the model has to say about the size of local sales. Remember that when parametrizing the model, we only used the data on the total employment of a¢ liates located in each country. We did not use the data on how much of the a¢ liates'output is sold locally. The model, however, can infer the percentage of output sold locally. It is equal to iih X i = P n nih X n , where n; i 6 = h. Figure B2 shows the local sales of the U.S. a¢ liates predicted by the model as percentages their total sales (output) in each country. Similarly to Figure D1 , this …gure shows a good deal of variation across countries.
It would be interesting to compare these model predictions to data. Of all the countries in the dataset, there is only data on the size of the local sales for the U.S. a¢ liates in Canada and Japan. 29 The percentage of the U.S. a¢ liates's output sold locally in Canada is predicted by the model to be 61%, while the data shows it to be 55%. In Japan, the model predicts the fraction of output sold locally to be 96%, while it is 90% in the data. The numbers are close, but the model overpredicts the size of the local sales somewhat. 30
Comparison with the Eaton-Kortum model
It is educational to compare the technology parameters h estimated above with the technology parameters of the Eaton-Kortum model. The Eaton-Kortum model assumes that there is no FDI or technology di¤usion so that all producers in country i draw productivity from that country's technology distribution. Speci…cally, the producer of good j in country i draws its production productivity z i (j) from the productivity distribution of country i that has the Fréchet form with the location parameter T i and shaping parameter (common to all countries).
As in the model of this paper, the producer of good j in country i can bring its good to country n at a cost d ni . Of course, among all the producers of good j (in various countries), only the producer that o¤ers the cheapest price succeeds in selling its good in country n. Given this setup, Eaton and Kortum derive the expression for bilateral trade:
where ni , c i , and d ni have the same meanings as in this paper. Eaton and Kortum assume that labor is the only factor of production, but for compatibility purposes I will modify their model and assume that capital and labor are the factors of production, so that c i is given by (1):
Eaton and Kortum derive the price index for their model:
where is a constant. The market clearing conditions in Eaton and Kortum and the model of this paper are the same, given by equations (12)- (15). I can infer the parameter values of the Eaton-Kortum model from the same data used in the previous section to infer the parameters of the model of this paper. Of course, the data on the activity of foreign a¢ liates will not be needed since the Eaton-Kortum model does not have FDI. Also, since I want to focus on the estimates of the technology parameters, I will use the trade costs d ni estimated in the previous section instead of using the Eaton-Kortum methodology of estimating them. 31 To infer the Eaton-Kortum's technology parameters, I will use the market clearing equation (12):
with ni given by (31), c i by (32), and p i by (33). Equations (34) constitute a system of N equations of N unknown T i 's. They are solved using data on output, spending, wages, and rates of return described in Section 4, and trade costs estimated in the previous section. How would we expect T and to be di¤erent? If there is no international production then T and should be the same. For small volumes of international production, their values should be similar. On the other hand, if a country has a low , but many producers from high-countries operating on its territory, we would expect its T to be noticeably higher than its . As the volume of international production increases, we would expect T 's to become more and more similar across countries, while 's would of course remain the same. In an extreme case, when international production is as easy as the domestic production (i.e.
= 1 for all pairs of countries), we would expect T 's to be the same in all countries. Table B9 presents each country's mean productivity inferred from the Eaton-Kortum model and normalized with respect to the United States. This mean productivity is calculated as
The values of these mean productivities are very similar to the values of Table B1 with the exception of Canada, where T CAN is higher than CAN . This result makes perfect sense in light of the discussion above. 32 As mentioned before, the present-day volumes of international production are fairly low for most countries. So for most countries the value of the parameter T is similar to the value of the parameter . This is even the case for the ROW where own technology is low so the potential bene…t from international production is high. One notable exception in the dataset is Canada where, as shown on Table D6 , 29% of the labor force is employed by foreign producers, mostly from the U.S. Therefore, T CAN is noticeably higher than CAN . This di¤erence implies a substantial technology transfer to Canada that we would expect to bring sizable welfare gains. Welfare gains from international production are analyzed in the Section 7.1.
As mentioned earlier, if international production is as easy as the domestic one, we would expect T 's to be the same in all countries. So, an interesting experiment would be to use the model of this paper to simulate a world in which international production is as easy as the domestic one and then use the Eaton-Kortum model to infer the T parameters in such a world. This experiment is done in Section 7.1.2.
Counterfactual simulations
Having a fully parametrized model allows us to perform counterfactual simulations. To simulate a scenario means to solve for the endogenous variables ni , ih , Q n , X n , w n , r n , and p n given the
, and ' n . The endogenous variables are found using equations (8), (11)- (15), and (4) reproduced below for convenience:
where nih is given by (21):
as de…ned earlier, and the cdf of prices given by (22):
7.1 Trade, international production, and welfare
This section will investigate the welfare e¤ects of international trade and production in manufactures. It will start by quantifying the welfare e¤ects of the current levels of trade and international production. It will then investigate a counterfactual world in which there are no barriers to trade and international production is as easy as the domestic one.
Autarky
First, we will consider how much the current level of international trade in manufactures contributes to welfare. For this purpose, a counterfactual experiment will simulate an increase in trade costs d ni (while holding all the other parameters constant at their baseline levels) to the point where international trade disappears. Welfare will be measured by real income. The results of the experiment, presented in the …rst column of Table S1 , show that the contribution of the current level of international trade to the current level of welfare varies between 0.5% in Japan and 4% in Canada. It is not surprising that the contribution of trade is the greatest in Canada: it currently spends a half of its income on foreign goods and sends a half of its output abroad. By comparison, Japan spends only 10% of its income on foreign goods and sends 20% of its output abroad. The numbers reported in the …rst column of Table S1 are similar to those presented in the fourth column of Table IX in Eaton and Kortum (2002) . 33 Next, we will consider how much the current level of international production in manufactures contributes to welfare. For this purpose, we will perform a counterfactual experiment that will simulate a decrease in implementation factors ih;i6 =h (while holding all the other parameters, including trade costs, constant at their baseline levels) to the point where international production disappears. 34 The results of this experiment are presented in the second column of Table S1 . As with trade, Japan has the distinction of having the smallest contribution of international production to welfare at 0.05%, while Canada has the largest at 2.1%. It is not surprising that the contribution of IP is the largest in Canada, since it has the greatest presence of foreign producers on its soil. As discussed in Section 4, about 30% of Canadian labor force is employed by foreign producers (mostly from the U.S.) that make a noticeable contribution to the average productivity in Canada.
The contribution of international production to welfare is smaller than the contribution of trade by a factor of two for Canada, Europe, and the U.S., factor of six for the ROW, and factor of nine for Japan. This result is not unexpected given that the current levels of international production are fairly modest for most countries. For example, only 1.5% of Japanese workers are employed by foreign producers.
Finally, we will consider how much the current levels of both trade and international production in manufactures (jointly) contribute to welfare. For this purpose, a counterfactual experiment will simulate a simultaneous increase in trade costs d ni and decrease in implementation factors ih;i6 =h to the point where both international trade and production disappear.
The combined welfare e¤ects of international production and trade, i.e. the e¤ects of openness, are presented in the third column of Table S1 . The model predicts that Canada would see its welfare reduced by about 7% if its manufacturing sector were to become closed to trade and international production. Canada being a small fairly open economy, this result is not surprising. Europe, the U.S., and ROW would see their welfare reduced by 1.7-2.5%, Japan by 0.6%.
The welfare e¤ect of both trade and international production is greater than the sum of the welfare e¤ect of trade and the welfare e¤ect of international production (i.e. column three of Table  S1 is greater than the sum of columns one and two). This occurs because trade and IP are, to some degree, substitutes. For example, when international trade is stopped, international production increases. Similarly, when international production is stopped, international trade increases.
Open world
It is also interesting to quantify the potential bene…ts to having free trade and international production. Free trade exists when all international trade costs d ni are equal to one, i.e. the same as the domestic trade costs. Free international production exists when all mean implementation factors 1= ih are equal to one, i.e. the same as the domestic mean implementation factors. With free IP, technology is freely mobile across countries.
This section will simulate several scenarios: (a) a world in which trade is free, but the implementation factors are same as in the today's world, (b) a world in which international production is free, but the trade costs are the same as in the today's world, and (c) a fully open world in which both trade and international production are free.
The last three columns of Table S1 show the welfare changes that are predicted by these simulations. We note that the potential gains from free trade and international production are much greater than the welfare gains from the current levels of trade and international production. 35 All countries are predicted to reap substantial rewards from more openness.
Gains from free trade depend on country size and current trade magnitude. Canada, as a small country, has the most to gain from free trade. Japan, as the currently least-open country, also stands to gain substantially. The size of gains from free international production are related to the current level of domestic technology. The ROW, having domestic technology that is much less productive than the other countries', stands to gain by far the most. Free international production gives it a very large 90% increase in welfare. This shows that technology di¤usion can be a source of signi…cant economic growth. This is especially true for less developed countries, such as the ROW, that have low productivities of domestically-sources technologies.
Comparing the gains from free trade and international production, we can see that for the U.S., the gains are similar. For countries with productive domestic technologies, such as Japan, free trade is more bene…cial than fully integrated international production. For countries with less productive domestic technologies, such as Europe and especially the ROW, free international production is more bene…cial. Being a small country, Canada bene…ts greatly from free trade. However, having relatively less productive domestic technologies, it also bene…ts signi…cantly from free international production.
The last column of Table S1 shows the predicted bene…ts of a completely open world, with free trade and international production. The numbers are quite large. The U.S. is predicted to see a 26% increase in its real income, Japan and Europe -40-45% increase. Canada and the ROW are predicted to bene…t the most: Canada stands to gain 110% while the ROW 118%. To put these numbers in perspective, consider that a 26% increase in real income can also be obtained from 8 years of a 3% annual economic growth. A 40-45% increase in real income can be obtained from 11.5-12.5 years of a 3% annual economic growth and a 110% increase -from 25 years.
Similarly to the case of autarky simulations of the previous section, the welfare e¤ect of both free trade and international production is greater than the sum of the welfare e¤ect of free trade and the welfare e¤ect of free international production. As in those simulations, this occurs because trade and IP are, to some extent, substitutes. For example, when international trade becomes free, international production decreases. Therefore, the liberalization of international production has a greater e¤ect on the size of international production when trade is free than when it is costly. Similarly, when international production becomes free, international trade drops. Therefore, trade liberalization has a greater e¤ect on the size of trade when international production is free than when it is costly. Table S2 shows what happens to the activity of foreign a¢ liates when international production becomes free (i.e. fully internationally integrated). 36 The ownership structure of producers becomes the same in all countries. Producers from more productive countries get a bigger slice of production, those from less productive countries get a smaller slice. Japanese producers become responsible for 38% of total employment, the U.S. producers for 30%. On the other hand, Canadian producers get 8% of labor in each country and the ROW producers get 2%. Still, even 8% represents big gains for Canadian producers, as can be seen by comparing Tables S2 and D6. Since with free international production the ownership structure is the same in all countries, the production productivities are also the same everywhere. This can be veri…ed by using the EatonKortum model to infer the technology parameters T i in the world with free international production. The parameters are inferred using the procedure described in Section 6 and the simulated data on output, spending, wages, and rates of return for the world with free international production. As expected, the estimated technology parameters T i are exactly the same in all countries. Therefore, the world with free international production is the world where technology has di¤used completely throughout the world.
Free trade agreements and o¤shoring
It is often suggested that implementing a free-trade agreement between a developed and developing country would result in more o¤shoring by the developed country's …rms. Given cheap labor in the developing country and cheap costs of bringing the goods back to the developed country, …rms would have an incentive to move their production to the developing country.
This section looks for the maximum size of this e¤ect by forecasting the consequences of removing all trade costs between the U.S. and ROW. This is accomplished by solving the model with d U S;ROW and d ROW;U S set to one. Of course free-trade agreements do not result in free trade. They only remove the policy-related trade barriers. However, since the current levels of the policy-related trade barriers between the U.S. and ROW are not known, I will estimate the upper bound of the e¤ects of a free-trade agreement by simulating completely free trade.
The model predicts all the usual consequences of a free trade agreement: higher volume of trade, greater welfare in both countries. However, we are speci…cally interested in what happens to o¤shoring by the U.S. producers. There are several ways to measure the volume of o¤shoring. One is to look at U S;ROW;U S which is the fraction of the U.S. spending that goes towards goods made by the U.S. …rms in the ROW. This number increases from 0.07% to 0.56%. Another way to measure o¤shoring is to look at the value of goods sold in the U.S. by the ROW-located U.S. producers relative to the total output in the ROW. This number increases from 0.06% to 0.5% as the consequence of the free-trade agreement.
Both measures show signi…cant, 8-fold increases. However, 0.56% or 0.5% are still small numbers. The main obstacles to the U.S. producers trying to establish production in the ROW are the low implementation factors they encounter there. Consider for example the world with free trade and fully integrated international production that was simulated in the previous section. In that world, fully 15.2% of the U.S. spending goes towards goods made in the ROW by the U.S. …rms. 37
Conclusion
The paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. Producers develop technology at the headquarters in their home countries and can implement this technology in any country around the world. When searching for the location of production, producers consider the costs of production and the proximity to goods markets. Important features of the model include technological di¤erences across producers, technology transfer through international production, and the presence of trade costs. Technology transfer means that the technology used in production in each country is endogenous. The model produces two gravity-like equations: one for international trade and the other for international investment.
The model is parametrized using data for …ve countries. Model parameters describe the states of technology in di¤erent countries, barriers to international investment, and trade costs. The estimated states of technology are compared and contrasted with the states of technology of the Eaton-Kortum model.
The model is used to quantify the welfare e¤ects of the current level of international production and trade. The current level of international production contributes between 0.05 and 2.1% to the current level of welfare, depending on the country, while the current level of trade contributes between 0.5 and 4%. The model is also used to quantify the welfare e¤ects of moving to a world with trade free trade and free international production. Free trade is estimated to increase welfare by 9-36% while free international production by 8-90%.
The model is used to study the e¤ects of a free-trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW on o¤shoring. The model predicts that such a free-trade agreement will cause o¤shoring to increase signi…cantly in percentage terms while remaining small in absolute terms. Welfare is predicted to increase in both countries. Note: importing countries are in rows while exporting countries are in columns. Table entries show how much the exporting country sends to each of the importing countries as a fraction of its total output. Revenue from domestic sales is shown on the diagonal. By design, each column adds up to one. Table B7 Expected price from exporting relative to international production Table B8 Expected price from domestic production relative to offshoring Figure B1 Trade costs vs. mean implementation factors 
